Sensor Networks for Emergency Response: Challenges and Opportunities Moulton (B.U), Lorincz et. al. (Harvard)

Ryan Seney <u>seneyr@wpi.edu</u> CS525M – Mobile & Ubiquitous Computing 3/28/2006



Overview

- Introduction
- CodeBlue Infrastructure
- Wireless Vital Sign Monitors
- Security Implications
- MoteTrack: RF-based Location Tracking



Introduction

- CodeBlue is a suite of applications
 - Wearable vital signs monitors
 - MoteTrack: personnel and patient tracking
- Tested by developing two monitors and PDA for triaging

3

CodeBlue Infrastructure

- Discovery & Naming
 - Device naming should be application centric
 - Decentralize discovery process to avoid single point of failure
- Robust Routing
 - Devices might need to communicate with others outside their immediate range
 - Ad hoc routing improves this through relaying
 - Vital sign sensors may need to send data to multiple devices

CodeBlue Infrastructure

Prioritization

- Very limited bandwidth in low-powered sensor radios
- Critical data MUST get delivered
 - Vital signs on patient in cardiac arrest, SOS messages, etc take priority
- Security
 - Efficient establishment of security credentials
 - Fluctuating number of responders and patients
 - Pre-deployed public key should not be assumed
 - Most devices won't have processing power to handle strong cryptography protocols



CodeBlue Architecture


- CodeBlue is an "information plane" providing services
 - Flexible naming scheme
 - Publish and subscribe routing framework
 - Authentication and encryption
 - Credential establishment and handoff
 - Location tracking
 - In-network filtering and aggregation



6



CodeBlue Architecture





CodeBlue Architecture

- Previous similar systems
 - Patient Centric Network
 - Common architecture for sensors in hospital rooms
 - Not focused on low power sensors in emergency response
 - Agent Based Casualty Care
 - Developing wearable physiological sensors



- Merger of motes with vital sign monitors
 Mote: Low-power, low-capability device
- Used Mica2 developed at UC Berkely
 - 7.3 MHz Amtel ATmega128L running TinyOS
 - 4 Kbytes RAM, 128 Kbytes ROM
 - Chipcon CC1000 Radio
 - 76.8 kbps, 20-30 meters indoors range
 - 5.7 cm x 3.2 cm x 2.2 cm
 - AA Batteries for continuous power up to a week
 - Up to months or years with duty cycling



- Limited bandwidth and computing power limits use of TCP/IP, DNS and ARP (Address Resolution Protocol)
- However, incredibly mobile and versatile

 Other nodes exist integrating all Mica2 functions onto a 5 mm² chip



10

- Non-invasive monitors
 - Heart rate, oxygen saturation, end-tidal CO₂ and serum chemistries
- Similar wireless enabled monitors
 - Nonin and Numed: sensors with Bluetooth
 - Radianse: RF-based location tracking system for hospital use
 - Mobi-Health Project: Continuous monitoring of patients with 3G enabled "Body-Area Network"





Mote-based sensors

- Pulse Oximeter:
 - Used by EMTs to measure heart rate and blood oxygen saturation (SpO₂)
 - Measures amount of light transmitted through non-invasive sensor on patient's finger
 - Smith-BCI daughterboard attached to Mica2 mote
 - Transfers heart rate and SpO₂ about once a second



12


Mote-based sensors

- Two-lead electrocardiogram (EKG)
 - Continually monitors heart's electrical activity through leads connected to patient's chest
 - Reports heart rate and rhythm
 - Custom built circuit board attached to Mica2 mote
 - Captures data at rate of 120 Hz
 - Compresses through differential encoding and transmits through Mica2 radio



13








14

- EMTs carry handheld computers (PDAs)
- Receive and visualize vitals from multiple patients
- Audible and visual alerts if vitals are outside specified range
- PDA data can be transferred to patient care record applications (iRevive)
 - Record patient history, identification and any intervention techniques





15

- Security important since patient records are confidential
- HIPAA (1996) mandates all medical devices must ensure privacy of patients' medical data
- Defense against capturing data, spoofing and DOS attacks in the field

16

- Should not assume that all organizations have exchanged security information (keys, certificates, etc.) ahead of time
- Personnel can't spend time typing passwords, logging into databases, etc. when arriving on the scene of an incident



17

- Ad hoc network security that selforganizes based on devices present
- Must cope with changing number of nodes

 Emergency personnel arriving, patients
 transported away
- Seamless credential handoff
 - First responder gives access rights to another without preexisting relationships between the two



18

- Traditionally use trusted outside authority for maintaining current information about access rights
- Architecture for outside contact might not be available at disaster scene
- Best-effort security model might be appropriate
 - Strong guarantees when outside connection available, weaker guarantees with poor or no connectivity
- Public key crypto can solve most of the above
 - But limited resources on sensors make this hard
 - Eg. 4 Kbytes of memory in Mica2 limits number of keys to be stored



- Elliptic Curve Cryptography as alternative
 - 163 bit ECC key equivalent to 768-bit RSA
 - Implement with integer arithmetic
 - No hardware floating point support on sensors
- Key generated in 35 seconds
 - Good performance if not frequently performed
- Could be used for generating symmetric keys in TinySec





Security Implications – Future Work

- Take advantage of available computing power
 - PDAs and laptops generate keys
 - Not complete solution since sensor nodes still need to know which devices to trust in order to offload security computations



21

- Two applications
 - Patient locating
 - Monitoring various patients need to know where they are located in case they need attention
 - Tracking responders in buildings
 - Firefighters in building with poor visibility, monitoring safe exit routes, central command monitoring



22

- Decentralized sensor network using lowpower single-chip radio trancievers
- Provides good location accuracy even with partial failures of tracking infrastructure
- Populate area with battery operated beacon nodes
 - Replace existing smoke detectors with new detectors containing integrated beacon node




23

- Beacon nodes periodically broadcast beacon messages
 - Tuple containing {sourceID, powerLevel}
 - sourceID is unique identifier of the node
 - powerLevel is transmission power level used to broadcast message
- Mobile nodes listen for some time to acquire a signature
 - Beacon messages received over time interval, and received signal strength indication (RSSI) for each message



24





25

- Reference signature is a signature plus a known 3D location
- Two phase process for estimating locations
 - Once beacons installed use a mobile node to acquire reference signatures at known, fixed locations throughout area
 - Later, mobile nodes can obtain a signature and send it to beacon node from which it received the strongest RSSI to estimate its current location



26

- System resembles RADAR, but:
 - MoteTrack is decentralized, no main back-end database involved
 - Replicates reference signatures set across beacon nodes so that each node stores only a subset of the reference signatures
 - Beacon nodes perform all data storage and computations using locally stored reference signatures




27

- MoteTrack tested on Harvard campus
- 20 beacon nodes distributed on one floor of CS building
- 1742m² area covered
- Achieved 80th percentile location accuracy of 3 meters over 74 separate location estimates
- Tolerate failure of up to 40 beacon nodes with negligible increase in error
- Accuracy is roughly the same as commercial 802.11 based location tracking systems
- Ultrasound based systems have higher accuracy
 Denser beacon placement and directional beacons



28





WPI

29



Obligatory Questions Page

Questions?





30